In the interests of getting this bog going again, and as an intuition check:
What do you make of the following statement:
(1) If it were to rain and not rain, then it would rain.
Does this strike you as trivially true, non-trivially true, or false?
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4 comments:
Barak,
It immediately strikes me as very confusing. But as soon as I start thinking about what it says it seems to be trivially true because it is equivalent to the following logical truth:
(~p or p) or p
which is true because it makes no claims about the world.
Why do you care?
-Einar
Assuming the conditional of that is the material conditional, then you're right that it is trivial. Actually, I intended it to be read as a subjunctive conditional, so I'll edit the original post to make that reading a bit clearer...
Barak,
After you edited it, it now looks as if I don't know the difference between subjunctive and material conditionals. Thanks for that...
In any case, it now seems trivially true to me because the antecedent is impossible. That is, since it can never be actualized I seem to have no problems with admitting its truth.
I think to myself: if it were to rain and not rain, then of course it would rain because it would not only not rain, but ALSO RAIN.
So much for my foreign intuitions.
But still, why do you care? What's at stake?
-Einar
I'm gonna count your vote -- in spite of what you say -- as being in favor of non-trivial truth, since you provide a quick argument for why you think it's true.
I don't believe that we have infallible access to our beliefs.
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