I think you brush up against a huge, huge methodological issue in premise (2). I'll give you that there are models of junky worlds, but that in itself doesn't buy you possibility -- there are models of all sorts of rival logical and mathematical theories, but that's a cheap kind of possibility. I might as well say that the law of non-contradiction isn't necessarily true because there are models where it fails.
You have a bit more room to argue in the conceivability line. But I'm not sure what notion of conceivability is the right one here. I certainly don't have positive conceivability -- when I try to imagine a junky world, I still imagine it as a world, as some kind of unity.
I don't mean to say that I have to positively conceive of something for it to be possible, but I think the bulk of the argument will be needed here to clarify your notion of possibility and the tests for it.
mere logical consistency is not sufficient for metaphysical possibility. I agree, and everyone else should too. The point was rather that logical consistency PLUS positive conceivability is a good indication of metaphysical possibility. In the case of junk I claim both are satisfied. It is logically consistent because there are junky models of non-classical mereologies. It is positively conceivable because we can imagine everything as extended and everything extended as being one half of something mereologically bigger. Or we can imagine our universe being a miniature universe housed in an "atom" of a replica universe, and the same with that universe, and so on ad infinitum. That amounts to positively conceiving of junk (at least according to the positive conceivability of Yablo and Chalmers). When in addition the two main arguments in favor of UC are not convincing, and hence can not work as a defeater for the conceivability of junk, then it seems indeed as if we are dealing with a genuine metaphysical possibility. What can possibly be in the way of its possibility here?
I certainly have positive conceivability in the case of junk. The only way I would deny it's being positively conceivable is if I could be shown a necessary proposition logically implying the negation of junk. But as of now there we know of no such proposition.
You are of course allowed to be stubborn and deny that you can positively conceive of it, but remember that notable people like Leibniz, Whitehead, and Bostock have claimed to be able to conceive of it. (Also, not to mention Frank Arntzenius at Wiggins Tavern, as well as Peter Simons at a bar in New Jersey.)
What keeps you from positively conceiving of it? You are not allowed to use your mere acceptance of UC because I argue that UC is not necessarily true.
you said: 'when I try to imagine a junky world, I still imagine it as a world, as some kind of unity.'
That is just as it should be. A junky world is a world indeed, it's just that 'world' functions as a plural term rather than a singular term. (Bas van Fraassen and Peter Simons has argued that 'world' might very well be a plural term.) And everything in it is related by a very intimate relation, namely proper parthood. So there is a strong sense of unity in a junky world.
when I try to imagine a junky world, I still imagine it as a world, as some kind of unity
It would be difficult to think of a world as an object composed of the objects existing in that world under the definition of composition Einar gave. Suppose we think that I am a part of the world, then, under the third clause of Einar's definition of the composition relation, my cells are literally not a part of the world, although they exist within it. This is because no one of a plurality of things xx which compose the world can have a part in common with another one of xx.
Every plurality is a plurality of at least one thing. (Though, really, I think every plurality is a plurality of at least two things.) Nothing exists at the empty world, so the empty world cannot be a plurality of the things which exist in it.
I agree with your first point against Barak's comment, but it's a mere technical point. It's perhaps better to work with the following definition (which I do in my paper on this, available on my webpage):
xx compose y iff each one of xx is a part of y and each part of y overlaps at least one of xx.
As for your second point. First, it's highly controversial whether there can be empty worlds. But I am very liberal when it comes to metaphysical possibilities, so I think they should be accepted. Second, that there are no empty pluralities is (again) a mere technical point. Though counterintuitive, systems can be constructed where there are empty pluralities (analogous to emtpy sets). But third, all I need for 'world' (and its cognates) is that they CAN work as plural terms. There need be nothing fixed and determinate about whether they work as singular or plural terms. 'World' might simply be neutral between singular or plural reference: if our world is junky it is a plural term, and if our world is an object it is a singular term. Note that there are other accounts that have to accept that there is no world (as an object): mereological nihilism (i.e. that there are only mereological atoms (assuming the world is not the one and only mereological atom)). (van Fraassen (1995) and Simons (2005?) has argued that 'world' (and 'the universe') may very well be a plural term.)
I agree with your first point against Barak's comment, but it's a mere technical point...that there are no empty pluralities is (again) a mere technical point.
If you are doing descriptive metaphysics, then your definition of "composition" should be faithful to our ordinary notion of composition. Whether that third clause is there or not is not a *mere* technical point; it is a substantive claim about what composition involves. Similarly, that pluralities are non-empty is part of what is ordinarily meant when *they* are discussed.
On the other hand, if you are explicating the notion of "composition" so that when you use that term you are not referring to what we ordinarily call composition, but some other notion composition*, then maybe it is just a technical point.
There need be nothing fixed and determinate about whether they work as singular or plural terms. 'World' might simply be neutral between singular or plural reference
Syntactically, I do not see how this is supposed to work in the case of 'world'. The way singular and plural terms behave grammatically is difficult, and they are not in general interchangeable. If you replace some singular term t occurring in a sentence S with a plural term p, the resulting string of words need not be another grammatical sentence. Some words, such as 'whose' used as an interrogative pronoun, are neutral with respect to this (e.g. 'Whose car is this?', when the car may belong to one or more people). I guess I'll have to look at van Fraassen.
Reference is another story, I think. Some people have thought that plural terms do not refer at all, the dispute being whether or not employing plural quantifiers commits us to pluralities as entities.
Lastly, while it may be controversial whether the empty world is metaphysically possible, it is definitely conceptually possible. So, taking 'plurality' to have its ordinarily meaning, worlds can not be analyzed as a kind of plurality.
to the extent there is an interesting distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics here (i.e. describe the actual structure of thought vs. providing a better structure), I am doing revisionary metaphysics, not descriptive. (In the end I intend to argue that compositon is one-many identity.)
It's interesting that you push me on the issues about 'world' because that's what I took to be of least importance. Maybe I was wrong. The main intuition is that syntactic/semantic issues should not carry too much weight when it comes to ontological or metaphysical issues. Semantics should not decide our ontology. There is thus a strong sense of metaphysical realism in the background here. But of course we cannot ignore semantics altogether, because then we wouldn't know what we're talking about anymore. It's a fine and difficult line to draw. (And here I think Barak's comment is right: we are up against a huge methodological issue here.) In my paper I simply appeal to authority here (van Fraassen and Simons). Another assumption I work with is irreducibly plural predication and quantification with plural reference. That is, I assume there are no "plural objects" (whatever that means), but that plural terms are irreducibly plural (not reducible to singular reference) referring to geuine pluralities (not singular entities or plural objects).
Concerning the empty worlds: I don't work with a distinction between conceptual and metaphysical possibilities because I don't understand the distinction. I hold conceptual and metaphysical possibility to be the same. (Though I do think there is a distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility).
Finally, if you refuse to accept the metaphysical possibility of junk merely because 'world' is a singular term, it's possible to hold that 'world' refers to the set of all the things that are proper parts of each other. That would keep 'world' singular. But of course, who thought we were referring to a set all along?
But why do you think the issues about 'world' are so important? Why couldn't 'the world' function like, say, 'the team', or why couldn't 'world' function like 'Manchester United'? I'm not sure. But, in any case, not much hinges on this for my personal purposes because I intend to argue that junk is impossible because composition is a form of identity (but I don't want to talk about that yet).
It sounds like Barak is right that methodological issues are in the neighborhood. I tend to think of metaphysical disputes as really being (or mostly being) logical or semantic disputes pace Dummett. So, naturally, I do not share you sentiment that "semantics should not decide our ontology"!
Concerning the empty worlds: I don't work with a distinction between conceptual and metaphysical possibilities because I don't understand the distinction. I hold conceptual and metaphysical possibility to be the same. (Though I do think there is a distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility).
Whatever conceptually possibility is, it is certainly different from metaphysical possibility. Conceptual possibility has to do with what we are able to conceive, imagine, or otherwise do with our concepts in various intentional states and acts. Metaphysical possibility has to do with the way things could actually be.
Unless you think that it is a logical truth that things exist, then the problem will remain.
Plus, you will still have problems with impossible worlds. Presumably, impossible worlds should not be too far off from possible worlds. I worry about how you might construe those as pluralities.
if you refuse to accept the metaphysical possibility of junk merely because 'world' is a singular term, it's possible to hold that 'world' refers to the set of all the things that are proper parts of each other.
Well, just to be clear, I do not take any position on junk or in mereology.
who thought we were referring to a set all along?
When trying to prove the completeness of a class of normal propositional modal logics, (such as K, T, D, S4, and S5), for example, worlds are construed as maximal consistent sets of propositions. In itself, that is just a mathematical trick for getting the result. However, some people do hold that worlds just are maximal consistent sets of propositions. (For what little it is worth, I personally think that view is dead wrong.)
But why do you think the issues about 'world' are so important?
I do not know *ultimately* how important the way worlds are construed is to your project -- I can not by a long shot claim to be an expert in metaphysics -- but I think it is important to have some clear conception of what they are if you are working with them. Your question about whether junk is possible or impossible is a question about whether worlds can be junky or not, right?
One thing that I have learned from science and logic is that details matter! :-)
How worlds are construed is of course important to my project, but how 'world' actually works is not (assuming a stronger form of realism than you seem to like).
I still don't understand the distinction between conceptual and metaphysical possibility. (I surely don't see why they are CERTAINLY different.) The way you describe conceptual possibility seems to be the one and only route to metaphysical possibility too. But while some theories about modality draw the distinction and some don't, this takes us too far afield into the issues about modality which I tried to stay neutral on.
Whether there must be something rather than nothing, or whether it's a logical truth that some things exist, is also a huge and hotly debated issue which I hope a paper on junk need not take an immediate stand on. Some theories about modality accept it, while some deny it. There is nothing about junk per se that implies the impossibility of the empty world. It's nowhere argued that all worlds are pluralities (i.e. that it is a necessary truth that a world is a plurality). Only that a world can be a plurality (i.e. that it is possible for a world to be a plurality). Also, as I said earlier, I personally am inclined to accept the empty world, so I don't want all worlds to be pluralities, only some of them. Thus, our individuation of worlds should remain neutral between pluralities and objects. Some worlds are objects, while others are (strongly united) pluralities of objects. This does not seem to me to be a very pressing problem. But I might be wrong.
Note that the view that some worlds are not objects is a view implied by many different philosophical positions. (Thus, at worst, I can plead "companion in guilt".)
Finally, I agree that details matter, but not all of them can be attended to in a 20 page paper. Further, it seems to me that some of the more important things that have come up in our debate here is that the possibility of junk might not be so much about the details, as it is about the "bigger" issues lying in the background. The details, it seems, can be worked out. In the end I think the bigger background issues will be a cost-benefit thing.
Anyway, thanks for comments. It's been helpful. -Einar
I thought it might be helpful here to review why conceivability (=logical possibility) is not a good guide to metaphysical possibility.
Following Levine (2001), let’s define conceivability (=conceptual possibility) as follows:
A situation S is conceptually possible relative to a representation R just in case, for any subject, ‘~R’ isn’t knowable a priori.
Equivalently,
A situation S is conceptually possible relative to a representation R just in case ‘~R’ is neither formally valid nor true in virtue of the meaning of the terms involved.
We can characterize the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility thus:
A situation S is metaphysically necessary just in case there is some representation R such that S is conceptually necessary relative to R.
A situation S is metaphysically possible just in case, for all representations R, if S falls under R, then S is conceptually possible relative to R.
In other words:
A situation S is metaphysically necessary just in case there is some representation R such that S falls under R and ‘R’ is formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved.
A situation S is metaphysically possible just in case, for all representations R, if S falls under R, then ‘~R’ is neither formally valid nor true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved.
The conceivability of S under R for a subject doesn’t guarantee that R is metaphysically possible because, even if ‘~R’ is neither formally valid nor true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved, there may be some *other* representation of S, R*, such that ‘~R*’ is formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. This is why conceivability doesn’t give us metaphysical possibility. When you look at things this way, the conceivability of a situation gives very little evidence that the situation is metaphysically possible.
So to say that junk is conceivable gives us little reason to think that it’s metaphysically possible. And to add that junk is *logically consistent* doesn’t really add anything, for a situation is conceptually possible relative to a representation only if ‘R’ is logically consistent.
I don't understand everything you say. Could you say some more about
(i) why you (or Joe) identify conceptual possibility and conceivability,
(ii) what you mean by 'conceptual possibility,
(iii) what you mean by 'formally valid', and
(iv) what you think IS a good guide to metaphysical possibility?
I didn't (and don't) think of conceivability the way you do. You must hold conceptual possibility to be more basic (or primitive) than metaphysical possibility. And by cutting the ties the way you seem to I'm not sure how we're entitled to talk about metaphysical possibility at all anymore.
The way I thought (and think) of it is roughly as follows: I take the notion of coherence as primitive (because we all need to do so, especially in the philosophy of mathematics...), but it must go beyond the lack of mere formal contradiction (p and not-p). I also take the notion of imagining as primitive.
Then I define positive conceivability as follows: p is positively conceivable iff one can coherently imagine a situation that verifies p.
I think of metaphysical necessity as follows: p is metaphysically necessary iff not-p is incoherent to an ideal conceiver.
I thus think of metaphysical possibility as follows: p is metaphysically possible iff p involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver.
I now take positive conceivability as a guide to metaphysical possibility as follows: positively conceiving p gives us prima facie reasons to believe that p is metaphysically possible. These prima facie reasons are falsified if someone can point to incoherent features of the situation that I imagine verifies p. The guide and its dialectic is such because we are not ideal conceivers.
(When it comes to junk, no one has been able to point to any such incoherent features. I take that as good reasons to think it is metaphysically possible.)
This seems to me to be a very nice way of getting to metaphysical possibility. Some might think it's too liberal, but it can be restricted within the same spirit. (What can I say, I'm a liberal man...)
I'm not sure how you (or Joe) can get to metaphysical possibility.
I avoid all talk of conceptual possibility (perhaps because I don't understand it). I only claim to (at least partly) understand metaphysical possibility and logical possibility (the mere lack of formal contradictions). To me conceptual possibility must be one of these (but you seem to identify it with conceivability. Why?)
It seems to me you think of conceivability as what many call 'negative conceivability': p is negatively conceivable iff one cannot imagine a situation that falsifies p. Is that so? But I agree, this is not a good guide to metaphysical possibility. But I also have to admit I'm not sure I understand your view.
All this is very sketchy (and hasty), but I think enough to make us suspect we think of these things very differently. (I'm curious what you think is wrong with my view.)
I will try to address some of your questions below. I’ll address the remaining ones in a later post.
1. Why identify conceptual possibility with conceivability?
To be honest, I’m not sure how to defend this claim. They just seem to be the same thing! I know that you think that certain situations are conceivable, so in my terminology you thereby think that certain situations are conceptual possible. I don’t think that much hangs on this; our dispute is probably just terminological. So let’s put this issue to the side for now.
2. What is it for a representation to be formally valid?
Here the idea is that if a representation is necessarily true, it’s true in virtue of its logical form (i.e. its syntactic structure) or in virtue of the meaning of its representational constituents. So to say that R is formally valid is to say that it’s necessarily true, and true in virtue of its logical form.
3. Why think that the proposal I outlined above (in particular the stuff about the connection between conceptual possibility and metaphysical possibility) is correct?
One of Levine’s motivations for the proposal is an admonition against brute metaphysical necessity. Here’s the idea. A “brute X” is a phenomenon that is X and there is no illuminating explanation for why it is X. Some facts about our world are, or at least might be, brute in this way. Why such-and-such properties are the fundamental properties as opposed to others, for example, may be a brute fact. Suppose one asks, “Why do these facts obtain?” An appropriate answer is “The world just happens to be that way.” Brute metaphysical necessity, on the other hand, is very strange. Here we are told not just that this just happens to be how things are, but this just happens to be how they have to be. Levine’s rejection of brute metaphysical necessity, then, amounts to this: what “just happens to be” can’t be “how it has to be”.
Let’s suppose that Levine is right about this, as I think he is. So how can we avoid brute metaphysical necessity? The answer seems to be this: say that metaphysical necessity is grounded in logic and perhaps meaning as well (depending on your views on the analytic/synthetic distinction). Hence we have the proposal outlined above: a situation S is metaphysically necessary just in case there is some representation R such that S falls under R and ‘R’ is formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. You suggested that Levine’s proposal “cuts the ties” between conceivability (conceptual possibility) and metaphysical possibility in such a way that we may not be “entitled to talk about metaphysical possibility at all anymore.” But as I have just explained Levine does precisely the opposite!
You are right to point out that the notion of conceivability I’m working with is what some have called negative conceivability. Is positive conceivability a better guide to possibility than negative conceivability? I’m not sure what I think about this. Here is one reason, however, to be skeptical.
Let’s characterize negative conceivability as I characterized conceivability above: A situation S is negatively conceivable relative to a representation R just in case ‘~R’ is neither formally valid nor true in virtue of the meaning of R’s representational constituents.
We can say that positive conceivability is negative conceivability plus some further ingredient. (What is the further ingredient? Perhaps it has to do with the format of the relevant representations; perhaps they can’t all be discursive. Let's stay neutral on this for now.) The worry is this: no matter what the extra ingredient is, there is always the possibility that there is some other representation of the imagined situation that *is* either formally invalid or false by virtue of the meaning of its representational constituents. Without some reason to think that there are no representations of the situation like this, we don’t have a good reason to think that the imagined situation is metaphysically possible.
But what about those who appeal to positive conceivability in their conceivability-to-possibility arguments? Are they wrong? Well, as I understand things, for folks like Chalmers who are generally sympathetic with conceivability-to-possibility arguments, it’s their two-dimensionalism that’s really doing the work rather than whether the conceivability is positive or negative (despite what they may say to the contrary). In Chalmers’ zombie argument, for example, the crucial claim is that the primary and secondary intensions of phenomenal concepts are the same, not that there is something special about positive conceivability.
p is metaphysically possible iff p involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver.
what's your story on undecidable statements/decision problems for which there is no computable function?
i have knee-jerk realist intuitions -- i.e. i judge it prima facie positively conceivable that lacking incoherence, even by an ideal conceiver's lights, does not entail metaphysical possibility.
==
separate line of thought. an ideal conceiver is no doubt an ideally *rational* conceiver, and i wonder if you follow chalmers in treating rationality as (another) primitive.
if so, we're characterizing metaphysical possibility in terms of primitive notions of imagination + rationality. anyone feel a little sick? that was supposed to be a deep methodological remark.
relatedly, trouble could be raised (and probably is about to be) for the kelly/joe line that metaphysical possibility should be cashed out in terms of 'formal validity + true in virtue of meaning'.
but i'm happier leaving met. poss. as clear as those notions are vs. helping oneself to epistemic primitives... ===
finally, i'm sorry not to comment on the main thrust of the origianl psot, but i don't know much metaphysics and didn't follow, among other things, the positive conceivability of junk examples.
my thought though is that since you're already collecting data fropm tavern customers in the northeastern US, that you might want to publish an experimental philosophy paper comparing their intuitions with strip club clientele in, say, bankok or tokyo.
it would at least make an itneresting grant proposal.
Your comments were helpful. But I now think we're not that far apart anymore.
You say that a situation S is metaphysically necessary just in case there is some representation R such that S falls under R and ‘R’ is formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the constituents involved.
I said that a proposition p is metaphysically necessary just in case not-p involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver.
Does your 'formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the constituents involved' mean the same as my 'not-p involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver'?
I said that my notion of coherence must go beyond mere lack of formal contradiction. Depending on ones notion of analyticity, your 'or true by virtue of the meaning of the constituents involved' might be that extra beyond. But I'm not sure.
I guess the reason I am skeptical of identifying conceivability and conceptual possibility is that I think that conceivability is conceptually prior to ANY kind of possibility because it is our guide to it. But depending on what you mean by 'conceptual possibility' maybe it is terminological.
I agree that we should avoid brute metaphysical facts. (That is one of my main arguments in favor of the possibility of junk.) But I took it as a virtue of my account (or rather the kind of account I support) of metaphysical necessity precisely to avoid such brute facts! P is metaphysically necessary iff not-p is incoherent to an ideal conceiver. Thus my notion of coherence does the work that your notions of formal validity and analyticity do. If so, then again, I'm not sure how much we disagree after all.
I do think there is a crucial difference between negative and positive conceivability as a route to possibility. Consider Goldbach's Conjecture. It is neither proved nor disproved. According to our definitions, I can negatively conceive of its truth, but I cannot positively conceive of its truth (if I could do the latter I would of course be very famous). But presumably if it is ever disproved, and for all we know it might happen, it is necessarily false. Hence, my negative conceivability is no good here as to its possibility. But if I could positively conceive of its truth, I would presumably have the proof of its truth, and hence it would be necessarily true, and hence my positive conceivability IS good as to its possibility. Thus, in this mathematical case there seems to be a crucial difference between negative and positive conceivability: positive conceivability is a better guide to metaphysical possibility. And I'm not sure what sense we can make of there being some other representation that is formally invalid or false by virtue of its constituents in this case.
I agree that it looks like our conceptions of metaphysical necessity are quite similar. I think our notions of metaphysical possible are similar too. You say that P is metaphysically possible just in case P involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver. I say that a situation S is metaphysically possible just in case, for all representations R, if S falls under R, then S is conceivable relative to R. An ideal conceiver would possess all the relevant representations of S, so these proposals come to pretty much the same thing.
Your discussion of Goldbach’s Conjecture raises some interesting issues. I think we need to distinguish between various sorts of propositions:
(1) Those that, if true, are a priori necessary truths; (2) Those, if true, are a posteriori necessary truths. (3) Those, if true, are contingently true.
With respect to (1)-type propositions, positive conceivability (arguably) *entails* metaphysical necessity (and thus possibility), as your discussion of the mathematical case shows. But this result alone doesn’t show that positive conceivability is a guide to necessity or possibility with respect to (2)-type and (3)-type propositions.
So I guess an important question is how you conceive of the junk thesis - which type of proposition is it?
the junk hypothesis is obviously intended to be of type 1. If it is true that junky worlds are possible it is necessarily true that junky worlds are possible (Cf. modal logic of kind S5); and no a posteriori considerations seems to be able to decide that. (That leaves us with type 1.)
This discussion has been helpful for clarifying my own thoughts.
When you imagine junk, you are not imaging that junk is possible; you are imaging that there is junk.
So the relevant proposition is not "Junk is possible" but "There is junk".
I take it that the latter is, if true, contingently true. Right? So imaging the latter does not give us good reason to believe that junk is possble. That was the point of my discussion.
So the stuff about possibilites being necessarily possible is not to the point.
You're right. I got a bit carried away and level-confused at the end.
But when I say I can positively conceive of a junky world I say I can imagine a situation that verifies the proposition that everything is a proper part of something. I thus imagine that there is junk. But my imagining only gives reasons (if any) for believing in a possibility. So in another sense I AM imagining a mere possiblity.
But I agree my junk hypothesis is rather of your type 3. But even so, it still seems to me that positive conceivability is a better guide to possibility than negative conceivability because when one positively conceive of something there seems to be no incoherence in the neighborhood. By merely negatively conceive of something we are far less sure of there being no incoherence in the neighborhood. So maybe we are a little bit more or better epistemically justified. But now I'm not sure how much really hinges on this. Because remember that the junk hypothesis was not merely supported by conceivability, but also by it being logically consistent (having models) as well as having been taken seriously by some philosophers and scientists. Those three components together was meant to give good reasons to believe it is indeed possibly true. At least, at this point, we seem to have no obvious reasons to believe it is not possibly true. Doesn't it seem hard to do metaphysics at all unless one holds these three components together to provide good reasons for possibility?
Another reasons I suspect not much hinges on the distinction between positive and negative conceivability at this point is that, positive or negative, conceivability together with logical consistency, as well as having been taken seriously by scientists and philosophers, seems to simply give us some reasons for there being no incoherence involved. And by the similarity of our accounts it seems that is enough to provide us with some reasons to believe it is metaphysically possible (i.e. that there is no representation of it that is formally invalid or false by virtue of its constituents.) That is of course not to say that we are infallible at this point; only that we have some prima facie reasons.
First let me say that I've been sort of playing devil's advocate, for, as you know, I'm fond of junk, gunk, bunk, monism, pluralism, shmonpism and the whole deal.
Second - on the way I have characterized conceivability (conceptual possibility), it aleady includes logical consistency (with respect to the representations at isssue), so logical consistency doesn't amount to another ingredient.
Third - I'm inclined to think that the scientific seriousness condition does add something important. But have scientists speculated about junk? This leads me to another question, one I'm sure demonstrates my ignorance. The question is this: scientists tell us that the universe is finite, right? Does junk require that the universe be infinite in size? Or that there is an infinte amount of matter? (Is this the same question?) Or are these considerations orthoganal to whether the actual world is junky?
I have also been playing the devil's advocate because I think junk (and hunk) is imposible due to the fact that composition is a form of identity: a whole and its parts are the same and hence (arguably) a junky world must be a whole and hence not a junky world after all. My playing with junk is part of a bigger project which is meant to amount to a reductio in favor of composition as a form of identity....
Depending on what you mean by formal validity, the extra ingredient of being logically consistent might be something else than your formal validity. Some statements can be logically consistent in the sense I meant, namely by having a model, without being formally valid, if by that one means true in all models (in virtue of logical form).
The hypothesis of the world being junky has been entertained (and believed) by at least Leibniz, Whitehead, and more recently, but only in the case of mathematics, Bostock. These guys are scientists as much as philosophers. E.g. Whitehead tried to give an interpretation of General and Special Relativity.
If the world is junky it needs to be infinite. But in what sense, i.e. in size or matter or ..., the hypothesis is silent on. Whitehead believed in a junky world of events. Bostock believes in junky mathematics (somehow, but I'm not sure exactly how). Leibniz believed in a junky world of bulk (primary matter).
So in what sense the world could be junky I would say nothing about.
Wanna Get HIGH? Running out of Supply? Then Check Out My Shit! >>>>> http://bestlegalhighsdrugs.info <<<< If you have questions, you can email my boy at online.mentor [at] gmail.com
[size=1] IGNORE THIS---------------------------- Meth Manufacture How To amanuta myscaria [url=http://bestlegalhighsdrugs.info] buy legal highs [/url] slavia divinlrum Where Is Salvia Sold [url=http://buybudshoplegalherbs.info] legal herb reviews[/url] Buy Hallucinogenic Herbs pass drug test secrets free [url=HTTP://BUYINGMARIJUANASALE.INFO] Purchase Marijuana [/url] the kratom exstasy ppills [url=HTTP://BUYLEGALBUDSCOMREVIEWS.INFO] buy legalbuds [/url] saalvia divinorumm faces of meth oregonian [url=HTTP://CANNABISHIGH-PILLSHIGH.INFO] Marijuana Highs[/url] Agonies bufp algarius [url=HTTP://HOWTOBUYWEED-BUYINGWEED.INFO] how to purchase marijuana online[/url] grow amanita muscaria how do i grow salvia [url=http://legalbud.drugreviews.info] legal bud [/url]
bufp alvarrius where to buy salvia divinorum in des moines [url=http://legalweed.lamodalatina.com] legalweeds [/url] buufo alvaruus How To Take Care Of Salvia Plants [url=http://buysalvia.lamodalatina.com] order salvia extracts[/url] Legal Ecstasy smanita muscsria
marijuana test kits amanits muscari [url=http://legalweed.lamodalatina.com] legal weeds [/url] random drug testing oral drug testing [url=http://buysalviacheap.com] get salvia powder[/url] injecting meth Legal Killer Buds [url=http://guaranteedheightincrease.info/]height improvement[/url] - http://guaranteedheightincrease.info/ height increase - http://guaranteedheightincrease.info [url=http://provenpenisenlargement.info/]proven penis growth[/url] - http://provenpenisenlargement.info/ proven penis enhancement - http://provenpenisenlargement.info/ [url=http://provenskincareadvice.info/]skin care techniques[/url] - http://provenskincareadvice.info/ skin care tips - http://provenskincareadvice.info/ [url=http://getrichgambling.info/]get money gambling[/url] - http://getrichgambling.info/ get riches gambling - http://getrichgambling.info/ [url=http://herpesoutbreak-gentalwarts.info/]herpes outbreak[/url] - http://herpesoutbreak-gentalwarts.info/ herpes outbreaks - http://herpesoutbreak-gentalwarts.info/ [url=http://STOP-PREMATURE-EJACULATION-SOLUTIONS.INFO]cure premature ejaculation[/url] - http://STOP-PREMATURE-EJACULATION-SOLUTIONS.INFO cure premature ejaculation - http://STOP-PREMATURE-EJACULATION-SOLUTIONS.INFO [url=http://3GMOBILEPHONESFORSALE.INFO]3g mobile cellphones on sale[/url] - http://3GMOBILEPHONESFORSALE.INFO mobile cellphones on sale - http://3GMOBILEPHONESFORSALE.INFO [url=http://internationaloddities.reviewsdiscountsonline.com] internationaloddities scam[/url] international oddities review [url=http://drobuds.reviewsdiscountsonline.com]review of dro buds [/url] dro buds reviews [url=http://bestacnetreatmentreviews.info] best acne treatment review[/url] http://bestacnetreatmentreviews.info acne treatment review http://bestacnetreatmentreviews.info [url=HTTP://LEARN-HYPNOSIS-ONLINE.INFO]learn hypnotism online[/url] learn hypnosis online
I am able to make link exchange with HIGH pr pages on related keywords like [url=http://www.usainstantpayday.com]bad credit loans[/url] and other financial keywords. My web page is www.usainstantpayday.com
If your page is important contact me. please only good pages, wih PR>2 and related to financial keywords Thanks adobDiaby
meagn fox naked, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187756]dirty pic megan fox[/url] megan fox and amanda seyfried kim kardashian naked ray j, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187768]kim kardashian and ray j video[/url] kim kardashian giving head to ray j taylor swift santa barbara, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187772]taylor swift music on a monologue[/url] lyrics to fifteen by taylor swift hanna montana mp3, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187786]hm310 hannah montana eyeglasses[/url] baby hannah montana songs list of harry potter books, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187792]harry potter auditions[/url] harry potter and draco malfoy slash fanfics cruises to med, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187798]cruise to cash and call me[/url] cruises to carribean how to meet justin bieber, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187812]justin bierber[/url] justin bieber my world is your world nasty pic of britney spears, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187814]123 britney spears lyrics[/url] britney spear .com megan fox n, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/175542]megan fox red dress[/url] megan fox at transformers premiere
if you guys predestined to conjecture [url=http://www.generic4you.com]viagra[/url] online you can do it at www.generic4you.com, the most trusted viagra drugstore evade of generic drugs. you can smite into uncover drugs like [url=http://www.generic4you.com/Sildenafil_Citrate_Viagra-p2.html]viagra[/url], [url=http://www.generic4you.com/Tadalafil-p1.html]cialis[/url], [url=http://www.generic4you.com/VardenafilLevitra-p3.html]levitra[/url] and more at www.rxpillsmd.net, the key [url=http://www.rxpillsmd.net]viagra[/url] framer on the web. well another great [url=http://www.i-buy-viagra.com]viagra[/url] pharmacy you can find at www.i-buy-viagra.com
Attraction casinos? go over this advanced [url=http://www.realcazinoz.com]online casinos[/url] exemplar and fake online casino games like slots, blackjack, roulette, baccarat and more at www.realcazinoz.com . you can also verify our new [url=http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com]casino[/url] direct at http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com and triumph over true to life folding shin-plasters ! another unsurpassed [url=http://www.ttittancasino.com]casino spiele[/url] within an eyelash of is www.ttittancasino.com , because german gamblers, come via charitable online casino bonus.
Frame the brute with two backs casinos? check this advanced [url=http://www.realcazinoz.com]online casino[/url] navigator and get up online casino games like slots, blackjack, roulette, baccarat and more at www.realcazinoz.com . you can also into our untrained [url=http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com]casino[/url] orientate at http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com and conquer realized change ! another unique [url=http://www.ttittancasino.com]casino spiele[/url] within an eyelash of is www.ttittancasino.com , for german gamblers, make freed online casino bonus.
Hello. Often the Internet can see links like [url=http://www.whitehutchinson.com/aboutus/]Buy cialis without prescription[/url] or [url=http://www.rc.umd.edu/bibliographies/]Buy cialis without prescription[/url]. Is it safe to buy in pharmacies such goods?
well guys! equal the latest self-governing [url=http://www.casinolasvegass.com]casino[/url] games like roulette and slots !report register out the all uncharted supernumerary [url=http://www.casinolasvegass.com]online casino[/url] games at the all late www.casinolasvegass.com, the most trusted [url=http://www.casinolasvegass.com]online casinos[/url] on the web! dig our [url=http://www.casinolasvegass.com/download.html]free casino software download[/url] and win money. you can also stop other [url=http://sites.google.com/site/onlinecasinogames2010/]online casinos bonus[/url] . check out this new [url=http://www.place-a-bet.net/]online casino[/url].
Infatuation casinos? enquire this advanced [url=http://www.realcazinoz.com]casino[/url] games. exemplar and play online casino games like slots, blackjack, roulette, baccarat and more at www.realcazinoz.com . you can also impede our new [url=http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com]casino[/url] orientate at http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com and conquer authentic folding spondulix ! another late-model [url=http://www.ttittancasino.com]casino[/url] spiele plot is www.ttittancasino.com , rather than of german gamblers, rise by unrestrained online casino bonus.
Great blog as for me. It would be great to read a bit more about this theme. The only thing I would like to see on that blog is a few pics of any gizmos.
Недавно задумался: а смогу ли я в России хоть когда-нибудь приобрести для себя новое жилье? И пришел к выводу, что это не смогу сделать ни я, ни, скорее всего, мои дети, когда вырастут. Даже во время кризиса цены на квадратный метр не упали до такого уровня, чтобы можно было не то чтобы накопить на квартиру (даже небольшую, эконом-класса), но даже чтобы можно было воспользоваться ипотекой (проценты-то по ней просто неподъемные). Есть у меня большие подозрения (да это и эксперты многие подтверждают), что рынок недвижимости у нас – просто «мыльный пузырь», и цены на нем в несколько раз выше, чем, по идее, должны были бы быть. Слышал что в Казахстане, к примеру, установлена фиксированная цена квадратного метра, которая регулируется государством, и выше которой никто из застройщиков не может продавать жилье. К тому же там и ставки по ипотеке вроде как намного ниже. Кто-нить из форумчан имеет более подробную инфу по этому поводу, действительно ли это так? [url=http://mp3lists.ru/][color=#E4F4FE] [/color][/url]
43 comments:
Einar,
I think you brush up against a huge, huge methodological issue in premise (2). I'll give you that there are models of junky worlds, but that in itself doesn't buy you possibility -- there are models of all sorts of rival logical and mathematical theories, but that's a cheap kind of possibility. I might as well say that the law of non-contradiction isn't necessarily true because there are models where it fails.
You have a bit more room to argue in the conceivability line. But I'm not sure what notion of conceivability is the right one here. I certainly don't have positive conceivability -- when I try to imagine a junky world, I still imagine it as a world, as some kind of unity.
I don't mean to say that I have to positively conceive of something for it to be possible, but I think the bulk of the argument will be needed here to clarify your notion of possibility and the tests for it.
Barak,
mere logical consistency is not sufficient for metaphysical possibility. I agree, and everyone else should too. The point was rather that logical consistency PLUS positive conceivability is a good indication of metaphysical possibility. In the case of junk I claim both are satisfied. It is logically consistent because there are junky models of non-classical mereologies. It is positively conceivable because we can imagine everything as extended and everything extended as being one half of something mereologically bigger. Or we can imagine our universe being a miniature universe housed in an "atom" of a replica universe, and the same with that universe, and so on ad infinitum. That amounts to positively conceiving of junk (at least according to the positive conceivability of Yablo and Chalmers). When in addition the two main arguments in favor of UC are not convincing, and hence can not work as a defeater for the conceivability of junk, then it seems indeed as if we are dealing with a genuine metaphysical possibility. What can possibly be in the way of its possibility here?
I certainly have positive conceivability in the case of junk. The only way I would deny it's being positively conceivable is if I could be shown a necessary proposition logically implying the negation of junk. But as of now there we know of no such proposition.
You are of course allowed to be stubborn and deny that you can positively conceive of it, but remember that notable people like Leibniz, Whitehead, and Bostock have claimed to be able to conceive of it. (Also, not to mention Frank Arntzenius at Wiggins Tavern, as well as Peter Simons at a bar in New Jersey.)
What keeps you from positively conceiving of it? You are not allowed to use your mere acceptance of UC because I argue that UC is not necessarily true.
-Einar
Barak,
you said: 'when I try to imagine a junky world, I still imagine it as a world, as some kind of unity.'
That is just as it should be. A junky world is a world indeed, it's just that 'world' functions as a plural term rather than a singular term. (Bas van Fraassen and Peter Simons has argued that 'world' might very well be a plural term.) And everything in it is related by a very intimate relation, namely proper parthood. So there is a strong sense of unity in a junky world.
-Einar
when I try to imagine a junky world, I still imagine it as a world, as some kind of unity
It would be difficult to think of a world as an object composed of the objects existing in that world under the definition of composition Einar gave. Suppose we think that I am a part of the world, then, under the third clause of Einar's definition of the composition relation, my cells are literally not a part of the world, although they exist within it. This is because no one of a plurality of things xx which compose the world can have a part in common with another one of xx.
it's just that 'world' functions as a plural term rather than a singular term.
I do not know if that is right. Pluralities are supposed to be non-empty, that is,
(∀xx)(∃y)(y < xx)
Every plurality is a plurality of at least one thing. (Though, really, I think every plurality is a plurality of at least two things.) Nothing exists at the empty world, so the empty world cannot be a plurality of the things which exist in it.
Timmo,
I agree with your first point against Barak's comment, but it's a mere technical point. It's perhaps better to work with the following definition (which I do in my paper on this, available on my webpage):
xx compose y iff each one of xx is a part of y and each part of y overlaps at least one of xx.
As for your second point. First, it's highly controversial whether there can be empty worlds. But I am very liberal when it comes to metaphysical possibilities, so I think they should be accepted. Second, that there are no empty pluralities is (again) a mere technical point. Though counterintuitive, systems can be constructed where there are empty pluralities (analogous to emtpy sets). But third, all I need for 'world' (and its cognates) is that they CAN work as plural terms. There need be nothing fixed and determinate about whether they work as singular or plural terms. 'World' might simply be neutral between singular or plural reference: if our world is junky it is a plural term, and if our world is an object it is a singular term. Note that there are other accounts that have to accept that there is no world (as an object): mereological nihilism (i.e. that there are only mereological atoms (assuming the world is not the one and only mereological atom)). (van Fraassen (1995) and Simons (2005?) has argued that 'world' (and 'the universe') may very well be a plural term.)
-Einar
I agree with your first point against Barak's comment, but it's a mere technical point...that there are no empty pluralities is (again) a mere technical point.
If you are doing descriptive metaphysics, then your definition of "composition" should be faithful to our ordinary notion of composition. Whether that third clause is there or not is not a *mere* technical point; it is a substantive claim about what composition involves. Similarly, that pluralities are non-empty is part of what is ordinarily meant when *they* are discussed.
On the other hand, if you are explicating the notion of "composition" so that when you use that term you are not referring to what we ordinarily call composition, but some other notion composition*, then maybe it is just a technical point.
There need be nothing fixed and determinate about whether they work as singular or plural terms. 'World' might simply be neutral between singular or plural reference
Syntactically, I do not see how this is supposed to work in the case of 'world'. The way singular and plural terms behave grammatically is difficult, and they are not in general interchangeable. If you replace some singular term t occurring in a sentence S with a plural term p, the resulting string of words need not be another grammatical sentence. Some words, such as 'whose' used as an interrogative pronoun, are neutral with respect to this (e.g. 'Whose car is this?', when the car may belong to one or more people). I guess I'll have to look at van Fraassen.
Reference is another story, I think. Some people have thought that plural terms do not refer at all, the dispute being whether or not employing plural quantifiers commits us to pluralities as entities.
Lastly, while it may be controversial whether the empty world is metaphysically possible, it is definitely conceptually possible. So, taking 'plurality' to have its ordinarily meaning, worlds can not be analyzed as a kind of plurality.
Timmo,
to the extent there is an interesting distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics here (i.e. describe the actual structure of thought vs. providing a better structure), I am doing revisionary metaphysics, not descriptive. (In the end I intend to argue that compositon is one-many identity.)
It's interesting that you push me on the issues about 'world' because that's what I took to be of least importance. Maybe I was wrong. The main intuition is that syntactic/semantic issues should not carry too much weight when it comes to ontological or metaphysical issues. Semantics should not decide our ontology. There is thus a strong sense of metaphysical realism in the background here. But of course we cannot ignore semantics altogether, because then we wouldn't know what we're talking about anymore. It's a fine and difficult line to draw. (And here I think Barak's comment is right: we are up against a huge methodological issue here.) In my paper I simply appeal to authority here (van Fraassen and Simons). Another assumption I work with is irreducibly plural predication and quantification with plural reference. That is, I assume there are no "plural objects" (whatever that means), but that plural terms are irreducibly plural (not reducible to singular reference) referring to geuine pluralities (not singular entities or plural objects).
Concerning the empty worlds: I don't work with a distinction between conceptual and metaphysical possibilities because I don't understand the distinction. I hold conceptual and metaphysical possibility to be the same. (Though I do think there is a distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility).
Finally, if you refuse to accept the metaphysical possibility of junk merely because 'world' is a singular term, it's possible to hold that 'world' refers to the set of all the things that are proper parts of each other. That would keep 'world' singular. But of course, who thought we were referring to a set all along?
But why do you think the issues about 'world' are so important? Why couldn't 'the world' function like, say, 'the team', or why couldn't 'world' function like 'Manchester United'? I'm not sure. But, in any case, not much hinges on this for my personal purposes because I intend to argue that junk is impossible because composition is a form of identity (but I don't want to talk about that yet).
-Einar
Einar,
It sounds like Barak is right that methodological issues are in the neighborhood. I tend to think of metaphysical disputes as really being (or mostly being) logical or semantic disputes pace Dummett. So, naturally, I do not share you sentiment that "semantics should not decide our ontology"!
Concerning the empty worlds: I don't work with a distinction between conceptual and metaphysical possibilities because I don't understand the distinction. I hold conceptual and metaphysical possibility to be the same. (Though I do think there is a distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility).
Whatever conceptually possibility is, it is certainly different from metaphysical possibility. Conceptual possibility has to do with what we are able to conceive, imagine, or otherwise do with our concepts in various intentional states and acts. Metaphysical possibility has to do with the way things could actually be.
Unless you think that it is a logical truth that things exist, then the problem will remain.
Plus, you will still have problems with impossible worlds. Presumably, impossible worlds should not be too far off from possible worlds. I worry about how you might construe those as pluralities.
if you refuse to accept the metaphysical possibility of junk merely because 'world' is a singular term, it's possible to hold that 'world' refers to the set of all the things that are proper parts of each other.
Well, just to be clear, I do not take any position on junk or in mereology.
who thought we were referring to a set all along?
When trying to prove the completeness of a class of normal propositional modal logics, (such as K, T, D, S4, and S5), for example, worlds are construed as maximal consistent sets of propositions. In itself, that is just a mathematical trick for getting the result. However, some people do hold that worlds just are maximal consistent sets of propositions. (For what little it is worth, I personally think that view is dead wrong.)
But why do you think the issues about 'world' are so important?
I do not know *ultimately* how important the way worlds are construed is to your project -- I can not by a long shot claim to be an expert in metaphysics -- but I think it is important to have some clear conception of what they are if you are working with them. Your question about whether junk is possible or impossible is a question about whether worlds can be junky or not, right?
One thing that I have learned from science and logic is that details matter! :-)
Timmo,
How worlds are construed is of course important to my project, but how 'world' actually works is not (assuming a stronger form of realism than you seem to like).
I still don't understand the distinction between conceptual and metaphysical possibility. (I surely don't see why they are CERTAINLY different.) The way you describe conceptual possibility seems to be the one and only route to metaphysical possibility too. But while some theories about modality draw the distinction and some don't, this takes us too far afield into the issues about modality which I tried to stay neutral on.
Whether there must be something rather than nothing, or whether it's a logical truth that some things exist, is also a huge and hotly debated issue which I hope a paper on junk need not take an immediate stand on. Some theories about modality accept it, while some deny it. There is nothing about junk per se that implies the impossibility of the empty world. It's nowhere argued that all worlds are pluralities (i.e. that it is a necessary truth that a world is a plurality). Only that a world can be a plurality (i.e. that it is possible for a world to be a plurality). Also, as I said earlier, I personally am inclined to accept the empty world, so I don't want all worlds to be pluralities, only some of them. Thus, our individuation of worlds should remain neutral between pluralities and objects. Some worlds are objects, while others are (strongly united) pluralities of objects. This does not seem to me to be a very pressing problem. But I might be wrong.
Note that the view that some worlds are not objects is a view implied by many different philosophical positions. (Thus, at worst, I can plead "companion in guilt".)
Finally, I agree that details matter, but not all of them can be attended to in a 20 page paper. Further, it seems to me that some of the more important things that have come up in our debate here is that the possibility of junk might not be so much about the details, as it is about the "bigger" issues lying in the background. The details, it seems, can be worked out. In the end I think the bigger background issues will be a cost-benefit thing.
Anyway, thanks for comments. It's been helpful.
-Einar
I thought it might be helpful here to review why conceivability (=logical possibility) is not a good guide to metaphysical possibility.
Following Levine (2001), let’s define conceivability (=conceptual possibility) as follows:
A situation S is conceptually possible relative to a representation R just in case, for any subject, ‘~R’ isn’t knowable a priori.
Equivalently,
A situation S is conceptually possible relative to a representation R just in case ‘~R’ is neither formally valid nor true in virtue of the meaning of the terms involved.
We can characterize the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility thus:
A situation S is metaphysically necessary just in case there is some representation R such that S is conceptually necessary relative to R.
A situation S is metaphysically possible just in case, for all representations R, if S falls under R, then S is conceptually possible relative to R.
In other words:
A situation S is metaphysically necessary just in case there is some representation R such that S falls under R and ‘R’ is formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved.
A situation S is metaphysically possible just in case, for all representations R, if S falls under R, then ‘~R’ is neither formally valid nor true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved.
The conceivability of S under R for a subject doesn’t guarantee that R is metaphysically possible because, even if ‘~R’ is neither formally valid nor true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved, there may be some *other* representation of S, R*, such that ‘~R*’ is formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. This is why conceivability doesn’t give us metaphysical possibility. When you look at things this way, the conceivability of a situation gives very little evidence that the situation is metaphysically possible.
So to say that junk is conceivable gives us little reason to think that it’s metaphysically possible. And to add that junk is *logically consistent* doesn’t really add anything, for a situation is conceptually possible relative to a representation only if ‘R’ is logically consistent.
-Kelly
Whenever I say "logical possibility" I mean to say "conceptual possibility" above.
Sorry about that.
Kelly,
I don't understand everything you say. Could you say some more about
(i) why you (or Joe) identify conceptual possibility and conceivability,
(ii) what you mean by 'conceptual possibility,
(iii) what you mean by 'formally valid', and
(iv) what you think IS a good guide to metaphysical possibility?
I didn't (and don't) think of conceivability the way you do. You must hold conceptual possibility to be more basic (or primitive) than metaphysical possibility. And by cutting the ties the way you seem to I'm not sure how we're entitled to talk about metaphysical possibility at all anymore.
The way I thought (and think) of it is roughly as follows: I take the notion of coherence as primitive (because we all need to do so, especially in the philosophy of mathematics...), but it must go beyond the lack of mere formal contradiction (p and not-p). I also take the notion of imagining as primitive.
Then I define positive conceivability as follows: p is positively conceivable iff one can coherently imagine a situation that verifies p.
I think of metaphysical necessity as follows: p is metaphysically necessary iff not-p is incoherent to an ideal conceiver.
I thus think of metaphysical possibility as follows: p is metaphysically possible iff p involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver.
I now take positive conceivability as a guide to metaphysical possibility as follows: positively conceiving p gives us prima facie reasons to believe that p is metaphysically possible. These prima facie reasons are falsified if someone can point to incoherent features of the situation that I imagine verifies p. The guide and its dialectic is such because we are not ideal conceivers.
(When it comes to junk, no one has been able to point to any such incoherent features. I take that as good reasons to think it is metaphysically possible.)
This seems to me to be a very nice way of getting to metaphysical possibility. Some might think it's too liberal, but it can be restricted within the same spirit. (What can I say, I'm a liberal man...)
I'm not sure how you (or Joe) can get to metaphysical possibility.
I avoid all talk of conceptual possibility (perhaps because I don't understand it). I only claim to (at least partly) understand metaphysical possibility and logical possibility (the mere lack of formal contradictions). To me conceptual possibility must be one of these (but you seem to identify it with conceivability. Why?)
It seems to me you think of conceivability as what many call 'negative conceivability': p is negatively conceivable iff one cannot imagine a situation that falsifies p. Is that so? But I agree, this is not a good guide to metaphysical possibility. But I also have to admit I'm not sure I understand your view.
All this is very sketchy (and hasty), but I think enough to make us suspect we think of these things very differently. (I'm curious what you think is wrong with my view.)
Please help me,
-Einar
I will try to address some of your questions below. I’ll address the remaining ones in a later post.
1. Why identify conceptual possibility with conceivability?
To be honest, I’m not sure how to defend this claim. They just seem to be the same thing! I know that you think that certain situations are conceivable, so in my terminology you thereby think that certain situations are conceptual possible. I don’t think that much hangs on this; our dispute is probably just terminological. So let’s put this issue to the side for now.
2. What is it for a representation to be formally valid?
Here the idea is that if a representation is necessarily true, it’s true in virtue of its logical form (i.e. its syntactic structure) or in virtue of the meaning of its representational constituents. So to say that R is formally valid is to say that it’s necessarily true, and true in virtue of its logical form.
3. Why think that the proposal I outlined above (in particular the stuff about the connection between conceptual possibility and metaphysical possibility) is correct?
One of Levine’s motivations for the proposal is an admonition against brute metaphysical necessity. Here’s the idea. A “brute X” is a phenomenon that is X and there is no illuminating explanation for why it is X. Some facts about our world are, or at least might be, brute in this way. Why such-and-such properties are the fundamental properties as opposed to others, for example, may be a brute fact. Suppose one asks, “Why do these facts obtain?” An appropriate answer is “The world just happens to be that way.” Brute metaphysical necessity, on the other hand, is very strange. Here we are told not just that this just happens to be how things are, but this just happens to be how they have to be. Levine’s rejection of brute metaphysical necessity, then, amounts to this: what “just happens to be” can’t be “how it has to be”.
Let’s suppose that Levine is right about this, as I think he is. So how can we avoid brute metaphysical necessity? The answer seems to be this: say that metaphysical necessity is grounded in logic and perhaps meaning as well (depending on your views on the analytic/synthetic distinction). Hence we have the proposal outlined above: a situation S is metaphysically necessary just in case there is some representation R such that S falls under R and ‘R’ is formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. You suggested that Levine’s proposal “cuts the ties” between conceivability (conceptual possibility) and metaphysical possibility in such a way that we may not be “entitled to talk about metaphysical possibility at all anymore.” But as I have just explained Levine does precisely the opposite!
Here is some more...
4. What about positive conceivability?
You are right to point out that the notion of conceivability I’m working with is what some have called negative conceivability. Is positive conceivability a better guide to possibility than negative conceivability? I’m not sure what I think about this. Here is one reason, however, to be skeptical.
Let’s characterize negative conceivability as I characterized conceivability above: A situation S is negatively conceivable relative to a representation R just in case ‘~R’ is neither formally valid nor true in virtue of the meaning of R’s representational constituents.
We can say that positive conceivability is negative conceivability plus some further ingredient. (What is the further ingredient? Perhaps it has to do with the format of the relevant representations; perhaps they can’t all be discursive. Let's stay neutral on this for now.) The worry is this: no matter what the extra ingredient is, there is always the possibility that there is some other representation of the imagined situation that *is* either formally invalid or false by virtue of the meaning of its representational constituents. Without some reason to think that there are no representations of the situation like this, we don’t have a good reason to think that the imagined situation is metaphysically possible.
But what about those who appeal to positive conceivability in their conceivability-to-possibility arguments? Are they wrong? Well, as I understand things, for folks like Chalmers who are generally sympathetic with conceivability-to-possibility arguments, it’s their two-dimensionalism that’s really doing the work rather than whether the conceivability is positive or negative (despite what they may say to the contrary). In Chalmers’ zombie argument, for example, the crucial claim is that the primary and secondary intensions of phenomenal concepts are the same, not that there is something special about positive conceivability.
-Kelly
einar--
p is metaphysically possible iff p involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver.
what's your story on undecidable statements/decision problems for which there is no computable function?
i have knee-jerk realist intuitions -- i.e. i judge it prima facie positively conceivable that lacking incoherence, even by an ideal conceiver's lights, does not entail metaphysical possibility.
==
separate line of thought. an ideal conceiver is no doubt an ideally *rational* conceiver, and i wonder if you follow chalmers in treating rationality as (another) primitive.
if so, we're characterizing metaphysical possibility in terms of primitive notions of imagination + rationality. anyone feel a little sick? that was supposed to be a deep methodological remark.
relatedly, trouble could be raised (and probably is about to be) for the kelly/joe line that metaphysical possibility should be cashed out in terms of 'formal validity + true in virtue of meaning'.
but i'm happier leaving met. poss. as clear as those notions are vs. helping oneself to epistemic primitives...
===
finally, i'm sorry not to comment on the main thrust of the origianl psot, but i don't know much metaphysics and didn't follow, among other things, the positive conceivability of junk examples.
my thought though is that since you're already collecting data fropm tavern customers in the northeastern US, that you might want to publish an experimental philosophy paper comparing their intuitions with strip club clientele in, say, bankok or tokyo.
it would at least make an itneresting grant proposal.
Kelly,
Your comments were helpful. But I now think we're not that far apart anymore.
You say that a situation S is metaphysically necessary just in case there is some representation R such that S falls under R and ‘R’ is formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the constituents involved.
I said that a proposition p is metaphysically necessary just in case not-p involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver.
Does your 'formally valid or true by virtue of the meaning of the constituents involved' mean the same as my 'not-p involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver'?
I said that my notion of coherence must go beyond mere lack of formal contradiction. Depending on ones notion of analyticity, your 'or true by virtue of the meaning of the constituents involved' might be that extra beyond. But I'm not sure.
I guess the reason I am skeptical of identifying conceivability and conceptual possibility is that I think that conceivability is conceptually prior to ANY kind of possibility because it is our guide to it. But depending on what you mean by 'conceptual possibility' maybe it is terminological.
I agree that we should avoid brute metaphysical facts. (That is one of my main arguments in favor of the possibility of junk.) But I took it as a virtue of my account (or rather the kind of account I support) of metaphysical necessity precisely to avoid such brute facts! P is metaphysically necessary iff not-p is incoherent to an ideal conceiver. Thus my notion of coherence does the work that your notions of formal validity and analyticity do. If so, then again, I'm not sure how much we disagree after all.
I do think there is a crucial difference between negative and positive conceivability as a route to possibility. Consider Goldbach's Conjecture. It is neither proved nor disproved. According to our definitions, I can negatively conceive of its truth, but I cannot positively conceive of its truth (if I could do the latter I would of course be very famous). But presumably if it is ever disproved, and for all we know it might happen, it is necessarily false. Hence, my negative conceivability is no good here as to its possibility. But if I could positively conceive of its truth, I would presumably have the proof of its truth, and hence it would be necessarily true, and hence my positive conceivability IS good as to its possibility. Thus, in this mathematical case there seems to be a crucial difference between negative and positive conceivability: positive conceivability is a better guide to metaphysical possibility. And I'm not sure what sense we can make of there being some other representation that is formally invalid or false by virtue of its constituents in this case.
What do you think?
-Einar
I agree that it looks like our conceptions of metaphysical necessity are quite similar. I think our notions of metaphysical possible are similar too. You say that P is metaphysically possible just in case P involves no incoherence to an ideal conceiver. I say that a situation S is metaphysically possible just in case, for all representations R, if S falls under R, then S is conceivable relative to R. An ideal conceiver would possess all the relevant representations of S, so these proposals come to pretty much the same thing.
Your discussion of Goldbach’s Conjecture raises some interesting issues. I think we need to distinguish between various sorts of propositions:
(1) Those that, if true, are a priori necessary truths;
(2) Those, if true, are a posteriori necessary truths.
(3) Those, if true, are contingently true.
With respect to (1)-type propositions, positive conceivability (arguably) *entails* metaphysical necessity (and thus possibility), as your discussion of the mathematical case shows. But this result alone doesn’t show that positive conceivability is a guide to necessity or possibility with respect to (2)-type and (3)-type propositions.
So I guess an important question is how you conceive of the junk thesis - which type of proposition is it?
-Kelly
Kelly,
the junk hypothesis is obviously intended to be of type 1. If it is true that junky worlds are possible it is necessarily true that junky worlds are possible (Cf. modal logic of kind S5); and no a posteriori considerations seems to be able to decide that. (That leaves us with type 1.)
This discussion has been helpful for clarifying my own thoughts.
Thanks Kelly,
-Einar
I think we are misunderstanding each other.
When you imagine junk, you are not imaging that junk is possible; you are imaging that there is junk.
So the relevant proposition is not "Junk is possible" but "There is junk".
I take it that the latter is, if true, contingently true. Right? So imaging the latter does not give us good reason to believe that junk is possble. That was the point of my discussion.
So the stuff about possibilites being necessarily possible is not to the point.
-Kelly
Kelly,
You're right. I got a bit carried away and level-confused at the end.
But when I say I can positively conceive of a junky world I say I can imagine a situation that verifies the proposition that everything is a proper part of something. I thus imagine that there is junk. But my imagining only gives reasons (if any) for believing in a possibility. So in another sense I AM imagining a mere possiblity.
But I agree my junk hypothesis is rather of your type 3. But even so, it still seems to me that positive conceivability is a better guide to possibility than negative conceivability because when one positively conceive of something there seems to be no incoherence in the neighborhood. By merely negatively conceive of something we are far less sure of there being no incoherence in the neighborhood. So maybe we are a little bit more or better epistemically justified. But now I'm not sure how much really hinges on this. Because remember that the junk hypothesis was not merely supported by conceivability, but also by it being logically consistent (having models) as well as having been taken seriously by some philosophers and scientists. Those three components together was meant to give good reasons to believe it is indeed possibly true. At least, at this point, we seem to have no obvious reasons to believe it is not possibly true. Doesn't it seem hard to do metaphysics at all unless one holds these three components together to provide good reasons for possibility?
Another reasons I suspect not much hinges on the distinction between positive and negative conceivability at this point is that, positive or negative, conceivability together with logical consistency, as well as having been taken seriously by scientists and philosophers, seems to simply give us some reasons for there being no incoherence involved. And by the similarity of our accounts it seems that is enough to provide us with some reasons to believe it is metaphysically possible (i.e. that there is no representation of it that is formally invalid or false by virtue of its constituents.) That is of course not to say that we are infallible at this point; only that we have some prima facie reasons.
Why exactly don't we?
-Einar
First let me say that I've been sort of playing devil's advocate, for, as you know, I'm fond of junk, gunk, bunk, monism, pluralism, shmonpism and the whole deal.
Second - on the way I have characterized conceivability (conceptual possibility), it aleady includes logical consistency (with respect to the representations at isssue), so logical consistency doesn't amount to another ingredient.
Third - I'm inclined to think that the scientific seriousness condition does add something important. But have scientists speculated about junk? This leads me to another question, one I'm sure demonstrates my ignorance. The question is this: scientists tell us that the universe is finite, right? Does junk require that the universe be infinite in size? Or that there is an infinte amount of matter? (Is this the same question?) Or are these considerations orthoganal to whether the actual world is junky?
-Kelly
Kelly,
I have also been playing the devil's advocate because I think junk (and hunk) is imposible due to the fact that composition is a form of identity: a whole and its parts are the same and hence (arguably) a junky world must be a whole and hence not a junky world after all. My playing with junk is part of a bigger project which is meant to amount to a reductio in favor of composition as a form of identity....
Depending on what you mean by formal validity, the extra ingredient of being logically consistent might be something else than your formal validity. Some statements can be logically consistent in the sense I meant, namely by having a model, without being formally valid, if by that one means true in all models (in virtue of logical form).
The hypothesis of the world being junky has been entertained (and believed) by at least Leibniz, Whitehead, and more recently, but only in the case of mathematics, Bostock. These guys are scientists as much as philosophers. E.g. Whitehead tried to give an interpretation of General and Special Relativity.
If the world is junky it needs to be infinite. But in what sense, i.e. in size or matter or ..., the hypothesis is silent on. Whitehead believed in a junky world of events. Bostock believes in junky mathematics (somehow, but I'm not sure exactly how). Leibniz believed in a junky world of bulk (primary matter).
So in what sense the world could be junky I would say nothing about.
-Einar
Wanna Get HIGH? Running out of Supply? Then Check Out My Shit!
>>>>> http://bestlegalhighsdrugs.info <<<<
If you have questions, you can email my boy at online.mentor [at] gmail.com
[size=1] IGNORE THIS----------------------------
Meth Manufacture How To amanuta myscaria [url=http://bestlegalhighsdrugs.info] buy legal highs [/url] slavia divinlrum Where Is Salvia Sold [url=http://buybudshoplegalherbs.info] legal herb reviews[/url] Buy Hallucinogenic Herbs pass drug test secrets free [url=HTTP://BUYINGMARIJUANASALE.INFO] Purchase Marijuana [/url] the kratom exstasy ppills [url=HTTP://BUYLEGALBUDSCOMREVIEWS.INFO] buy legalbuds [/url] saalvia divinorumm faces of meth oregonian [url=HTTP://CANNABISHIGH-PILLSHIGH.INFO] Marijuana Highs[/url] Agonies bufp algarius [url=HTTP://HOWTOBUYWEED-BUYINGWEED.INFO] how to purchase marijuana online[/url] grow amanita muscaria how do i grow salvia [url=http://legalbud.drugreviews.info] legal bud [/url]
bufp alvarrius where to buy salvia divinorum in des moines [url=http://legalweed.lamodalatina.com] legalweeds [/url] buufo alvaruus How To Take Care Of Salvia Plants [url=http://buysalvia.lamodalatina.com] order salvia extracts[/url] Legal Ecstasy smanita muscsria
marijuana test kits amanits muscari [url=http://legalweed.lamodalatina.com] legal weeds [/url] random drug testing oral drug testing [url=http://buysalviacheap.com] get salvia powder[/url] injecting meth Legal Killer Buds
[url=http://guaranteedheightincrease.info/]height improvement[/url] - http://guaranteedheightincrease.info/
height increase - http://guaranteedheightincrease.info
[url=http://provenpenisenlargement.info/]proven penis growth[/url] - http://provenpenisenlargement.info/
proven penis enhancement - http://provenpenisenlargement.info/
[url=http://provenskincareadvice.info/]skin care techniques[/url] - http://provenskincareadvice.info/
skin care tips - http://provenskincareadvice.info/
[url=http://getrichgambling.info/]get money gambling[/url] - http://getrichgambling.info/
get riches gambling - http://getrichgambling.info/
[url=http://herpesoutbreak-gentalwarts.info/]herpes outbreak[/url] - http://herpesoutbreak-gentalwarts.info/
herpes outbreaks - http://herpesoutbreak-gentalwarts.info/
[url=http://STOP-PREMATURE-EJACULATION-SOLUTIONS.INFO]cure premature ejaculation[/url] - http://STOP-PREMATURE-EJACULATION-SOLUTIONS.INFO
cure premature ejaculation - http://STOP-PREMATURE-EJACULATION-SOLUTIONS.INFO
[url=http://3GMOBILEPHONESFORSALE.INFO]3g mobile cellphones on sale[/url] - http://3GMOBILEPHONESFORSALE.INFO
mobile cellphones on sale - http://3GMOBILEPHONESFORSALE.INFO
[url=http://internationaloddities.reviewsdiscountsonline.com] internationaloddities scam[/url]
international oddities review
[url=http://drobuds.reviewsdiscountsonline.com]review of dro buds [/url]
dro buds reviews
[url=http://bestacnetreatmentreviews.info] best acne treatment review[/url] http://bestacnetreatmentreviews.info
acne treatment review http://bestacnetreatmentreviews.info
[url=HTTP://LEARN-HYPNOSIS-ONLINE.INFO]learn hypnotism online[/url]
learn hypnosis online
I am able to make link exchange with HIGH pr pages on related keywords like [url=http://www.usainstantpayday.com]bad credit loans[/url] and other financial keywords.
My web page is www.usainstantpayday.com
If your page is important contact me.
please only good pages, wih PR>2 and related to financial keywords
Thanks
adobDiaby
Hi there everyone, I just registered on this perfect discussion board and desired to say hi there! Have a excellent day!
meagn fox naked, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187756]dirty pic megan fox[/url] megan fox and amanda seyfried
kim kardashian naked ray j, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187768]kim kardashian and ray j video[/url] kim kardashian giving head to ray j
taylor swift santa barbara, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187772]taylor swift music on a monologue[/url] lyrics to fifteen by taylor swift
hanna montana mp3, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187786]hm310 hannah montana eyeglasses[/url] baby hannah montana songs
list of harry potter books, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187792]harry potter auditions[/url] harry potter and draco malfoy slash fanfics
cruises to med, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187798]cruise to cash and call me[/url] cruises to carribean
how to meet justin bieber, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187812]justin bierber[/url] justin bieber my world is your world
nasty pic of britney spears, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/187814]123 britney spears lyrics[/url] britney spear .com
megan fox n, [url=http://discuss.tigweb.org/thread/175542]megan fox red dress[/url] megan fox at transformers premiere
hey everybody
I just wanted to introduce myself to everyone!
Can't wait to start some good conversations!
-Marshall
Thanks again!
hiya
great forum lots of lovely people just what i need
hopefully this is just what im looking for looks like i have a lot to read.
if you guys predestined to conjecture [url=http://www.generic4you.com]viagra[/url] online you can do it at www.generic4you.com, the most trusted viagra drugstore evade of generic drugs.
you can smite into uncover drugs like [url=http://www.generic4you.com/Sildenafil_Citrate_Viagra-p2.html]viagra[/url], [url=http://www.generic4you.com/Tadalafil-p1.html]cialis[/url], [url=http://www.generic4you.com/VardenafilLevitra-p3.html]levitra[/url] and more at www.rxpillsmd.net, the key [url=http://www.rxpillsmd.net]viagra[/url] framer on the web. well another great [url=http://www.i-buy-viagra.com]viagra[/url] pharmacy you can find at www.i-buy-viagra.com
Attraction casinos? go over this advanced [url=http://www.realcazinoz.com]online casinos[/url] exemplar and fake online casino games like slots, blackjack, roulette, baccarat and more at www.realcazinoz.com .
you can also verify our new [url=http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com]casino[/url] direct at http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com and triumph over true to life folding shin-plasters !
another unsurpassed [url=http://www.ttittancasino.com]casino spiele[/url] within an eyelash of is www.ttittancasino.com , because german gamblers, come via charitable online casino bonus.
Frame the brute with two backs casinos? check this advanced [url=http://www.realcazinoz.com]online casino[/url] navigator and get up online casino games like slots, blackjack, roulette, baccarat and more at www.realcazinoz.com .
you can also into our untrained [url=http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com]casino[/url] orientate at http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com and conquer realized change !
another unique [url=http://www.ttittancasino.com]casino spiele[/url] within an eyelash of is www.ttittancasino.com , for german gamblers, make freed online casino bonus.
Hello. Often the Internet can see links like [url=http://www.whitehutchinson.com/aboutus/]Buy cialis without prescription[/url] or [url=http://www.rc.umd.edu/bibliographies/]Buy cialis without prescription[/url]. Is it safe to buy in pharmacies such goods?
well guys! equal the latest self-governing [url=http://www.casinolasvegass.com]casino[/url] games like roulette and slots !report register out the all uncharted supernumerary [url=http://www.casinolasvegass.com]online casino[/url] games at the all late www.casinolasvegass.com, the most trusted [url=http://www.casinolasvegass.com]online casinos[/url] on the web! dig our [url=http://www.casinolasvegass.com/download.html]free casino software download[/url] and win money.
you can also stop other [url=http://sites.google.com/site/onlinecasinogames2010/]online casinos bonus[/url] . check out this new [url=http://www.place-a-bet.net/]online casino[/url].
Infatuation casinos? enquire this advanced [url=http://www.realcazinoz.com]casino[/url] games. exemplar and play online casino games like slots, blackjack, roulette, baccarat and more at www.realcazinoz.com .
you can also impede our new [url=http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com]casino[/url] orientate at http://freecasinogames2010.webs.com and conquer authentic folding spondulix !
another late-model [url=http://www.ttittancasino.com]casino[/url] spiele plot is www.ttittancasino.com , rather than of german gamblers, rise by unrestrained online casino bonus.
Yo Fellow Forumites
Seems like www.blogger.com seems to be a righteous forum for me
I am ecstatic to have discovered it.
I thought you might like this : If you get to it and you can't do it, well there you jolly well are, aren't you. :
Lol!
Anybody have an interest in Toy Collecting
Looking forward to a good long stay here!
Illinois,Wadsworth
Rather cool blog you've got here. Thanks for it. I like such themes and anything that is connected to this matter. I would like to read more soon.
Julia Smith
escort und kiev
Great blog as for me. It would be great to read a bit more about this theme. The only thing I would like to see on that blog is a few pics of any gizmos.
Katherine Flouee
jammers cell phone
Damn, rather great information. Where can I get your subscription?
Katty Flouee
spy source
Недавно задумался: а смогу ли я в России хоть когда-нибудь приобрести для себя новое жилье? И пришел к выводу, что это не смогу сделать ни я, ни, скорее всего, мои дети, когда вырастут. Даже во время кризиса цены на квадратный метр не упали до такого уровня, чтобы можно было не то чтобы накопить на квартиру (даже небольшую, эконом-класса), но даже чтобы можно было воспользоваться ипотекой (проценты-то по ней просто неподъемные). Есть у меня большие подозрения (да это и эксперты многие подтверждают), что рынок недвижимости у нас – просто «мыльный пузырь», и цены на нем в несколько раз выше, чем, по идее, должны были бы быть. Слышал что в Казахстане, к примеру, установлена фиксированная цена квадратного метра, которая регулируется государством, и выше которой никто из застройщиков не может продавать жилье. К тому же там и ставки по ипотеке вроде как намного ниже. Кто-нить из форумчан имеет более подробную инфу по этому поводу, действительно ли это так?
[url=http://mp3lists.ru/][color=#E4F4FE] [/color][/url]
Post a Comment