I'm interested in the Many Minds Interpretation of quantum mechanics (hereafter, MMI). A few other people are too. The people that go around defending it are usually committed to a thesis I'll call 'psycho-pluralism.' Psycho-pluralists believe that there are many subjective experiencers where there is usually believed to be only one such experiencer. Now, I know that I can't plausibly defend MMI--there's a lot of things about quantum probability I would need to know in order to do that properly. But I think I might be able to argue that MMI is better than the Many Worlds Interpretation (hereafter, MWI). The MWI involves commitment to what I'll call 'globo-pluralism': the view that there are many branches of the universe where we there is usually believed to be only one. Both psycho- and globo-pluralism are radically counterintuitive theses (i.e., the sort of theses that non-metaphysicians are moved to laughter by), so it is a prima facie strike against any theory to endorse them. (That said, the pluralisms I've formulated are pretty vague, since what is "usually believed" is far from clear.)
Here's one bad way to argue that MMI is better than MWI: MMI entails psycho-pluralism, but not globo-pluralism. MWI, on the other hand, entails commitment to both. Since one should avoid prima facie objectionable commitments whenever possible, one should endorse MMI rather than MWI. This argument fails miserably. For one thing, it seems that if one believed in globo-pluralism, one need not endorse psycho-pluralism, since it seems "usual" to believe there to be only one subjective experiencer for every individual located in some or other branch of the universe. So it seems to me that even if one endorsed globo-pluralism, one would not thereby be committed to psycho-pluralism. (Some philosophers have actually defended globo-pluralism and the view that holds there to be only one branch (viz., our branch) that is populated with conscious individuals. Interestingly, Peter Forrest likes a similar view of consciousness with respect to possible worlds.)
Here's a (slightly) better way to argue against MWI. There is independent reason to believe psycho-pluralism, but there is no such reason to believe globo-pluralism; therefore, MMI is preferable to MWI. This independent reason is courtesy of Peter Unger's "Mental Problem of the Many", which addresses the Problem of the Many that Lewis takes up in "Many, but Almost One." Suppose that consciousness is intrinsic. If x is an intrinsic property of F, then any object that is duplicate of F instantiates x. Assume your brain is conscious. Subtract a lone particle from your brain. Assume (reasonably, I think) that you remain conscious. Given such a possibility, there are two objects that are conscious that overlap parts of your brain: Your brain and your brain minus that lone particle. This is because 'you' would remain conscious even if you were to lose more than one particle of your brain. Plausibly, you could survive losing many particles and, less plausibly, you might survive the loss of an infinite number of increasingly small particles. It seems, then, that, independent of the considerations of quantum mechanics, psycho-pluralism might be true. (The premise doing the heavy-lifting here is the intrinsicality of consciousness. See Merricks and Sider's discussion of this issue in PPR (2001?))
I can think of no analogous argument for globo-pluralism (of the non-Goodmanian sort). I think this largely because being a world seems to be an extrinsic property unlike consciousness. So, absent an analogous argument for globo-pluralism, have I supplied you with some reason to think MMI is superior to MWI?
Here's one bad way to argue that MMI is better than MWI: MMI entails psycho-pluralism, but not globo-pluralism. MWI, on the other hand, entails commitment to both. Since one should avoid prima facie objectionable commitments whenever possible, one should endorse MMI rather than MWI. This argument fails miserably. For one thing, it seems that if one believed in globo-pluralism, one need not endorse psycho-pluralism, since it seems "usual" to believe there to be only one subjective experiencer for every individual located in some or other branch of the universe. So it seems to me that even if one endorsed globo-pluralism, one would not thereby be committed to psycho-pluralism. (Some philosophers have actually defended globo-pluralism and the view that holds there to be only one branch (viz., our branch) that is populated with conscious individuals. Interestingly, Peter Forrest likes a similar view of consciousness with respect to possible worlds.)
Here's a (slightly) better way to argue against MWI. There is independent reason to believe psycho-pluralism, but there is no such reason to believe globo-pluralism; therefore, MMI is preferable to MWI. This independent reason is courtesy of Peter Unger's "Mental Problem of the Many", which addresses the Problem of the Many that Lewis takes up in "Many, but Almost One." Suppose that consciousness is intrinsic. If x is an intrinsic property of F, then any object that is duplicate of F instantiates x. Assume your brain is conscious. Subtract a lone particle from your brain. Assume (reasonably, I think) that you remain conscious. Given such a possibility, there are two objects that are conscious that overlap parts of your brain: Your brain and your brain minus that lone particle. This is because 'you' would remain conscious even if you were to lose more than one particle of your brain. Plausibly, you could survive losing many particles and, less plausibly, you might survive the loss of an infinite number of increasingly small particles. It seems, then, that, independent of the considerations of quantum mechanics, psycho-pluralism might be true. (The premise doing the heavy-lifting here is the intrinsicality of consciousness. See Merricks and Sider's discussion of this issue in PPR (2001?))
I can think of no analogous argument for globo-pluralism (of the non-Goodmanian sort). I think this largely because being a world seems to be an extrinsic property unlike consciousness. So, absent an analogous argument for globo-pluralism, have I supplied you with some reason to think MMI is superior to MWI?
--Sam
16 comments:
Sam,
A good and interesting argument takes one from some plausible premises to a conclusion, where the minimal requirement is that the premises are not less plausible than the conclusion. Remember that the premises are meant to SUPPORT the conclusion. I think that is the main problem with your argument: the premises are more controversial (and crazy) than the conclusion they are meant to support.
-Einar
Dear Einar,
Your unorthodox view of arguments is fascinating to me. But let me take a stab at formulating an argument in accord with your proto-Nietzschean theory of argumentation:
(p1) Certain metaphysical considerations count--however slightly--in favour of psycho-pluralism. (p2) No comparable considerations count--however slightly--in favour of globo-pluralism.
(p3) Other things being equal, we ought to prefer theses that have independent support to theses that have no independent support.
(c1) We ought to prefer MMI to MWI, since--and here's a big assumption--they are equally plausible in other respects and there are independent considerations in favour of MMI but not MWI (i.e., there's a Mental Problem of the Many, but no Universal Problem of the Many).
Wow. These "arguments" of yours are exciting to formulate....
Samuel,
Concerning your new argument: as you state it I take it premise 1 is true. I'm pretty sure there are some metaphysical considerations in favor of MMI. Otherwise, why would several smart people ever have held the view?
Premise 2, as you state it, seems simply impossible to adequately defend. It is an extremely general and radical claim. In fact, it seems just plain false. After all, several smart people have held the view (MWI), so there should be some metaphysical considerations in favor of it, however slightly they count. And they should even be comparable to the ones in favor of MMI. What about Wallace? He gives some metaphysical considerations in favor of MWI, if you ask me. I believe Cian Dorr does too.
Premise 3 seems true. But given that premise 2 is false, the conclusion doesn't follow.
Now, if you meant to fill in p1 and p2 with the considerations from Unger, then my first reply to your argument kicks in again: the premises are weaker than the conclusion and the conclusion is too weak to be believable, and hence the argument doesn't get off the ground.
-Einar
Dearest Einar,
Thanks for your comments. I confess to being less than clear in my sketch of this argument for MMi. When I note that there are "certain metaphysical considerations that count in favour of psycho-plurarlism", I'm not claiming that there are no independent considerations that might sway one towards MWI over MMI--obviously there are independent reasons that might make the latter more attractive than the former. Rather, I'm claiming that there is no independent consideration that motivates the specific thesis of globo-pluralism, which is entailed by yet distinct from MWI, while there is a consideration--the mental problem of the many--that motivates the specific thesis of psycho-pluralism, entailed by yet distinct from MMI. Note that I'm offering what you describe as an "argument" rather than a general assesement of the relevant theories (i.e., MMI and MWI). So pointing out that "several smart people have held the view (MWI)" seems to obscure the point in question--the indepedent motivation for globo- and psycho-pluralism.
--sam
Sam,
my main point is only that the mental problem of the many seems to have many solutions that are less controversial than MMI (e.g. partial identity, 4D). Thus solving it by invoking MMI seems a bit far fetched. By having a premise meant to support MMI that says something like "the mental problem of the many gives independent support for MMI" seems to me to give me a premise that I am much less likely to accept than your conclusion. That's all.
-Einar
Sam,
Also, would you like to go over to the physics department and tell them that we, the armchair philosophers, have discovered for philosophical reasons having to do with the mind, that the many minds interpretation is true, or even preferrable over the many worlds interpretation?
I don't.
-Einar
PS: actually I'm not so sure about this argument. Maybe I would tell them so, if I became convinced. I don't think most physicists really know what they're talking about anyway. hm...
Einar,
I don't even know where the physics department is! (Which is definitely a good thing.)
One point I want to clarify. You say: "my main point is only that the mental problem of the many seems to have many solutions that are less controversial than MMI (e.g. partial identity, 4D). Thus solving it by invoking MMI seems a bit far fetched."
I'm not in any way claiming that MMI is a solution to the mental problem of the many. It most definitely is not. I was only committed to the claim that the psycho-pluralism motivated by the mental problem of the many should make MMI seems, in this very limited respect, more attractive than MWI.
Thanks again for the comments. Let me know if Anaximander or some other Greek believed MMI...
I don't think most physicists really know what they're talking about anyway.
...and philosophers, for that matter? How much quantum theory do you know?
Anonymous,
it was NOT meant as saying that physicists don't know physics. Or that philosophers know more physics than physicists. That's crazy. Rather, most physicists don't care about metaphysics or philosophy. Nor, perhaps, should they. Just as mathematicians don't care about the ontology of mathematics (and hence in that sense don't really know what they're talking about). They only (or mostly, there are exceptions) care about getting the facts right. In short, it was not meant as an insult.
-Einar
Anonymous, I think your (confused and mistaken) point would have been better put if you had placed your italics properly.
Two things occur to me.
First, many think that the property being conscious is an extrinsic property of states that instantiate it (e.g. higher-order theorists).
Second, it's not so clear that the property being the world (or being a world) is non-intrinsic. Suppose that priority monism is true and Lewis is right in thinking that the fundamental properties are intrinsic. The property being the world in this case is perhaps intrinsic.
-Kelly
Another thought: but even if being conscious is a non-intrinsic property of your mental states, it's an intrinsic property of you. I guess that's all you need in your argument.
-Kelly
MMI has one (apparent) great virtue that other interpretations don't have - it's a local theory. That is, there's no 'spooky action at a distance', and thus one of the major clashes with special relativity is side-stepped. I'm not sure how MWI fares on this issue, and it's not clear how much weight we should give such considerations (or whether locality should even be given positive valency). But anyway, on the face of it, locality gives prima facia support for MMI.
I'm not sure what stands in the way of a philosopher going over to the physics department and suggesting that a particular interpretation is preferable for philosophical reasons. Given the way this subject has tended to evolve, the issues raised by QM have tended to overlap with the tradition concerns of epistemologicists, metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, etc. The two interpretations under discussion here make heavy duty claims about the nature of mind and modal reality respectively; why shouldn't those claims be required to be sensitive to what can be said in favor or against those claims by people who have (I have seen no reason to doubt) credentials to say something on such matters? The idea that philosophers should strive to develop pictures of the world that are answerable to our best physical theories, but that physics (etc) can ignore what philosophers have to say - even when physicists find themselves making distinctively philosophical claims - strikes me as little more than a kind of scientism. (I don't mean to suggest that any one in the current debate committed themselves to anything so strong. But some of the tendencies that lead to such a take were, I think, on display).
I'm sure some people will want to give the usual 'but philosophy is incapable of producing any firm results' stuff in response. But I hope nobody here is impressed by such noise.
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